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Thank you for being here and thank you to Steve Petras, Ted Parran, and 
Chios Carmody and Members of the Canada-United States Law Institute Board 
for helping us host such a great gathering. 
Let me start by giving the audience a brief big picture of why this is a 
particularly perilous time for free trade. Then, I will transition to a few punctual 
trade issues where Canada and the United States can engage in cooperation to 
address current protectionist practices. Finally, I will conclude with a couple of 
comments about two very important trade issues in the bilateral relationship 
where we may not be as “trade sympatico”: the expiration of the Softwood 
Lumber Agreement (“SLA”) and the current status of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (“TPP”) in Congress. 
I. ISSUE #1: THE BIG PICTURE – WHY ARE WE LIVING IN DANGEROUS 
TRADE TIMES? 
Since the economic slowdown that started in December, 2007 and the 
following Great Recession, the United States and its biggest trade partners 
(Canada, the European Union (“E.U.”), Japan, and China) have lived in a world 
awash with excess savings and inadequate demand. In this stagnant economic 
environment, interest rates in the Western world cannot fall any further to help 
boost investment and economic activity because rates are already near zero. 
In other words, we are in a liquidity trap: without an increase in government 
spending, the private sector will keep on saving and waiting for a recovery in the 
long term, and the long term becomes longer as further economic retrenchment 
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occurs. Thus, President Obama’s first-term economic stimulus helped reduce the 
depth of the recession, but later budget sequesters and other forms of political 
budget brinkmanship damped the frail recovery. Abenomics, a mix of 
quantitative easing and massive spending in infrastructure, is having mixed 
results, getting Japan out of a two-decade long period of stagnation. 
If you do not believe we are in a liquidity trap, remember the warnings about 
how the United States’ “dependence on Chinese financing” through purchases of 
Treasury bonds would harm the United States once the Chinese stopped buying 
bonds? Well, the Chinese have been selling them for nearly a year and a half and 





















From the beginning of 2014 to the end of 2015, the Chinese Central Bank 
reduced total reserves (well over half of which are U.S. bonds) by about $800 
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U.S. interest rates on ten-year bonds are still below two percent,3 and it does 
not look like they are poised to rise anytime soon! But why am I pointing out this 
macroeconomic/finance data to you? I am a trade law professor. What do I 
know? 
I am pointing this out, because, in a normal growth world, the negative 
employment effects of running a trade deficit tend to be offset, partially and, 
possibly totally, by greater capital inflows. Capital inflows reduce interest rates, 
which, as economists point out, boost economic activity and thus employment. 
Of course, a trade deficit can also eliminate some employment, but that impact is 
mostly distributional as other sectors benefit from cheaper availability of capital 
and investment and may hire more than otherwise. 
Now, here is the big problem: this balancing effect of greater capital inflows 
that comes with trade deficits disappears when interest rates are already close to 
zero. As you recall, in such a world, rates can go no lower. So, in a stagnant 
macroeconomic environment, the following occurs: (i) trade deficits are bad for 
jobs because capital inflows provide little to zero relief; and (ii) every 
devaluation by traditionally export-growth-based countries is a hit on economic 
recovery. Specifically, most of the foreign capital that is coming into the United 
States does not get directly invested in the real economy. It is invested in 
government bonds and short-term deposits, investments that stay fallow if a 
government decides not to take advantage of near-zero interest rates. Arguably, 
this is because of an opposition-controlled Congress, hell-bent on fiscal austerity 
and/or willingness to sabotage economic recovery under President Obama. 
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Regardless, with continued capital inflows, the United States has seen its 
currency appreciate. Countries like China, Japan, and Brazil, all for different 
reasons, have had currency devaluations. So, in a world awash with liquidity and 
little investment, where capital inflows do not mitigate the loss of jobs through 
free trade, how can Canada and the United States ensure that they do not get 
taken advantage of? A partial answer can be found on my discussion of Issue #2, 
to which I now turn.  
II. ISSUE #2: AREAS OF CONVERGENCE, THEREFORE EASIER COOPERATION 
I would say that the starting point for a joint agenda should be a coordinated 
approach to ensuring that export-surplus countries do not succeed in gaming the 
system. Let us start with the following low-hanging fruit: 
(1) Canada, the United States and the E.U. should join forces in dealing 
with issues of overcapacity in steel and other basic industrial goods. Excess 
capacity in Asia is threatening jobs in North America and Western Europe 
at a time when popular dissatisfaction with trade is at its highest; 
(2) Canada and the United States must adopt a common approach to 
pressuring China and other countries to reduce Internet controls. The Great 
Chinese Firewall is a significant trade barrier to the world-beating Internet 
companies on both sides of the 46th parallel. Chinese internet regulations 
and their ostensible focus on blocking politically objectionable material is 
a façade: Canadian and U.S. suppliers of consumer and capital goods are 
being arbitrarily blocked from selling their products in China and other 
Southeast Asian countries. A recent New York Times article stated that 
services offered by Google, Facebook, and Twitter are blocked so that the 
opportunity for further business through these media is also being taken 
away. Worse, Home Depot pages, famous for marking what must be 
politically sensitive home improvement wares (said with sarcasm, of 
course), are swept under the Firewall as well. 
(3) Another big, present question is how Canada and the United States 
respond to China’s self-described graduation from Non-Market Economy 
(“NME”) status. Do you see the problem here? While the World Trade 
Organization Appellate Body has been busy eviscerating importing 
Members’ Anti-Dumping remedies, with the effective destruction of the 
more import agency-deferential standard under Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
Article 17.54 no doubt giving a big boost to trade-managing economies, 
China now wants to further its mercantilist policies by demanding market 
economy treatment? This, from a country where domestic prices are 
administered. Thus, whether it is steel overcapacity, internet-based trade 
barriers, or NME, Canada and the United States have a lot of work to do 
together. Now, on to the less sympatico part. 
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III. ISSUE #3: TWO VERY IMPORTANT ISSUES: LUMBER AND THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
With the expiration of the SLA, the trade litigation peace period ends in 
October, 2016. Complicating factors such as inter-provincial differences and the 
U.S. industry’s ability to file a case under U.S. trade statutes (if it deems its 
interests are not observed) should encourage all parties to, again, look for a 
balanced deal. 
On TPP, Canada and the United States have much convergence and, in some 
usually complicated areas, reached a balanced deal. For instance, in dairy 
products, Canada preserved its “supply management” system while conceding 
greater market access. More recent news suggests that this compromise might 
unravel, so one ought to be cautious. 
Trade diplomats from both countries seemed satisfied at the conclusion of 
the negotiations but, U.S. congressional resistance to a vote during the “lame 
duck” session and concerns over the investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) 
mechanism—national security, tobacco, and art and culture carveouts, 
notwithstanding—make it hard to predict what will happen after the election. 
Also, this will make it difficult to predict how other TPP countries might react to 
the enacting bill or statement of administrative action coming late this summer 
from the Executive Office of the President. 
From the U.S. perspective, I believe, the United States Trade Representative 
must be interested in how the Canadian-E.U. Comprehensive Economic Trade 
Agreement is finalized. The United States is not comfortable with the European 
permanent court approach, and Canada finds itself now in an interesting spot. 
As an academic, I am much more concerned with ISDS in TPP than with any 
eventual agreement with the EU under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership. To be clear, my biggest concern lies with weakening regulatory 
standards more than ISDS (although, concerns with the operation of the latter are 
also very important). Clearly, most TPP members have lower standards. That 
tends not to be the case with Canada. Of course, I still have major concerns with 
how adjudicators review cases under either ad hoc or permanent tribunal setups. 
Do they effectively apply the standards of review that they are required to? My 
own misgivings aside, finalizing an ISDS deal with countries that have lower 
regulatory stringency is a much more serious consideration than doing the same 
with Canada or the E.U. 
I am sure the panelists and participants in this conference will be scoping out 
and giving careful thought about these issues. Hopefully, these discussions will 
contribute to greater trade convergence and coordinated action. 
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